By Jackson M.O.
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Extra resources for A crash course in implementation theory
I. 1994, A Necessary and Su cient Condition for Walrasian Social Choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 62, pp. 186 208. Nakamura, S. 1988, Feasible Nash Implementation of Competitive Equilibria in an Economy with Externalities," mimeo: University of Minnesota. Nakamura, S. 1990, A Feasible Nash Implementation of Walrasian Equilibria in the Two Agent Economy," Economics Letters, Vol. 34, pp. 5 9. Nakamura, S. 1998, Impossibility of Nash Implementation in Two Person Economies," Economic Design, Vol.
And S. Srivastava 1989b, Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97, pp. 668 691. , and S. Srivastava 1991, Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies," Econometrica, Vol. 59, pp. 479 502. , and S. Srivastava 1993, Bayesian Implementation, Harwood Academic Publishers. Peleg, B. 1996a, A Continuous Double Implementation of the Constrained Walrasian Equilibrium," Economic Design, Vol. 2, pp. 89 97.
For instance, in an exchange economy this would be satis ed by setting w to be the 0 allocation, provided the social choice correspondence leaves each agent with some minimal consumption in every state. 2 is the requirement that captures the separable nature of the environment. It states that it is possible to reduce the allocations of some set of individuals J while not a ecting the remaining individuals. This is satis ed in exchange economies that satisfy free disposal, as well as other settings such as those with public goods and or externalities provided there is at least one disposable private good that agents value su ciently.
A crash course in implementation theory by Jackson M.O.